Networks and Dynamics of Violent Political Mobilization
Historical Evidence from Spain
Giacomo Lemoli and Sergi Martínez
sdmartines@eafit.edu.co | sergimartinez.github.io
Motivation
Motivation
We reached the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946 (PRIO, 2024).
- Syria, Ethiopia, or Colombia. Who fights?
What leads people to take arms?
What drives volunteers and conscripts?
Literature and theoretical expectations
Theory: volunteers and compliers
Volunteers, first movers usually qualified as hardliners.
Defined by group identities, incl. ideology or ethnicity (Sanı́n and Wood 2014; Abramson and Qiu 2024; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Kalmoe 2020; Nussio 2017).
Interaction w/charismatic and persuasive elites (Arjona and Kalyvas 2012; Dippel and Heblich 2021; Cagé et al. Forthcoming).
Expectation: Pre-existing electoral-patronage networks can define enlistment.
Theory: volunteers and compliers
Compliers: opposed or neutral who comply when called up.
Potential Non-compliers: opposed to the cause, will only comply when the threated.
Control and fear for retribution can raise collaboration (Kalyvas 2006) and increase military performance (Lyall and Zhukov 2021; Rozenas, Talibova, and Zhukov 2023).
Potential non-compliers, require formal and informal threats of retribution (Bonnier et al. 2020; Nussio and Ugarriza 2021; Rogall 2021).
Expectations
- Compliers: Conscription can increase enlistment among non first-movers.
- Potential non-compliers require a higher formal and informal threat of retribution, like social networks.
The Spanish Civil War in Navarre
The Spanish 1930s
Spanish Civil War
1936-1939: Civil War
Failed fascist coup that divided the country for 39 months
Rebels, Francoists vs. Loyalists contenders of the Republic
Both sides killed and displaced civilians using indiscriminate and selective techniques
About 500,000-800,000 deaths
known as the “dress rehearsal for WWII”
Spanish Civil War
Navarre
Conservative and religious, but diverse in ideological, ident., and economy (Caspitegui 2005).
Navarre: Carlism
2nd Republic (1931-36/9), right-wing parties, incl. the Carlists, Comunión Trad.
The fascist coup and the mobilization
July 18, 1936: Franco staged the coup.
In 10 days, elect. and paramilitary networks joined 10K volunteers in Pamplona.
Posterior compulsory conscription
August ’36, stable territorial control.
Both sides called for conscripts.
Rebels: 13 call ups on 12 cohorts (1929-1941).
Municipality-level evidence
on first movers
Results: Electoral roots of rebellion
- If it’s about electoral networks, Turnout ’36 and Right-wing vote share ’36 should predict voluntary enlistment.
Volunteers vs. conscripted
% Right-wing ’36 on voluntary enlistment
Robust to controlling for population, literacy, males %, single males %, ’33 right %, altitude, ruggedness, and Part. Jud. FE:
Right share ’36:
β =0.132, se=0.033, p<0.01.Turnout:
β =0.097, se=0.044, p<0.05.
Table in Appendix A.1. Effect more intense in municipalities w/ Carlist officials.
Further confirmed in DiD models, Appendix A.2.
Individual networks of compliance
Data: Networks of compliance
34’ voting-age census (n ≈ 175,000, 1/2 males).
File of Navarrese fighters (n ≈ 30,000 excl. Pamplona, 15K>23 y/o).
- Surnames and occupation allow us to estimate each citizen’s social ties with first-movers (Cruz, Labonne, and Querubin 2017; Arias et al. 2019).
Example of family networks
Results: Networks of compliance
Implications. If threat yields compliance among non first movers:
Conscription should increase enlistment.
If fear is at play, social ties with first movers should increase compliance further.
DiD, time = conscription waves [t=12] and conscripted cohorts, or bef-aft [t=2].
Results: Networks of compliance (II)
| Main effects | Men | Main, binary nw | Men, binary nw | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cohort conscription | 0.174 | 0.154 | 0.221 | 0.200 |
| (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
| First-movers nw (log) x Conscription | 0.058 | 0.058 | ||
| (0.003) | (0.003) | |||
| First-movers nw (bin) x Conscription | 0.115 | 0.115 | ||
| (0.007) | (0.007) | |||
| Num.Obs. | 335665 | 157150 | 335665 | 157150 |
Enlist to avoid imprisonment, get rid of stigma and police persecution (Leira-Castiñeira 2020).
As the way to switch sides (Rego 2014; Leira-Castiñeira and Domı́nguez-Almansa 2018).
Conclusion
Next steps
Aggregate level
The role of ideological preferences vs. patronage/electoral networks, in progress.
The role of associations in mobilization.
Individual level
Digitization of individual-level registry data on participation in conservative association before the war, in progress.
Recreation of other possible proto-fascist networks.
Conclusions
The interwar period backsliding was endogenous to the pre-war scenario:
- Pre-war electoral networks can foster the emergence of first movers, and first movers can raise compliance to conscription.
Literature
Roots of democratic backsliding and conflict mobilization (e.g., Kalmoe 2020; Dippel and Heblich 2021), joining lit. on interwar fascism (e.g., Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth 2017).
Puts together the role of networks (Bai, Jia, and Yang 2023; Cruz, Labonne, and Querubin 2020) w/lit. on violent mobilization (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Arjona and Kalyvas 2012) and conflict processes (Kalyvas 2006; Gates 2017).
Policy implications: Detect to block the nodes of undemocratic mobilization (Rogall 2021).
¡Thanks for your attention!
Comments to sdmartines@eafit.edu.co and giacomo.lemoli@iast.fr.
💪 Juanjo, Harrison, Kenzie, Paola, Sara, Cristian, and Natalia; 💰 BBVA, Bobst, IAST-TSE, and EAFIT.
References
References
Abramson, Scott F, and Xiaoyan Qiu. 2024. “A Cause to Fight.” Available at SSRN.
Arias, Eric, Pablo Balán, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubı́n. 2019. “Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks.” American Political Science Review 113 (2): 475–98.
Arjona, Ana M, and Stathis N Kalyvas. 2012. “Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters.” Understanding Collective Political Violence, 143–71.
Bai, Ying, Ruixue Jia, and Jiaojiao Yang. 2023. “Web of Power: How Elite Networks Shaped War and Politics in China.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 138 (2): 1067–1108.
Bonnier, Evelina, Jonas Poulsen, Thorsten Rogall, and Miri Stryjan. 2020. “Preparing for Genocide: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Rwanda.” Journal of Development Economics 147: 102533.
Cagé, Julia, Anna Dagorret, Pauline Grosjean, and Saumitra Jha. Forthcoming. “Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Combat Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France.” American Economic Review, Forthcoming.
Caspitegui, Francisco Javier. 2005. “" Spain’s Vendee": Carlist Identity in Navarre as a Mobilising Model.” In The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards. Cambridge University Press.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War. Cambridge University Press.
Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” American Economic Review 107 (10): 3006–37.
———. 2020. “Social Network Structures and the Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the Philippines.” American Political Science Review 114 (2): 486–501.
Dippel, Christian, and Stephan Heblich. 2021. “Leadership in Social Movements: Evidence from the" Forty-Eighters" in the Civil War.” American Economic Review 111 (2): 472–505.
Gates, Scott. 2017. “Membership Matters: Coerced Recruits and Rebel Allegiance.” Journal of Peace Research 54 (5): 674–86.
Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M Weinstein. 2008. “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 436–55.
Kalmoe, Nathan P. 2020. With Ballots and Bullets: Partisanship and Violence in the American Civil War. Cambridge University Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press.
Leira-Castiñeira, Francisco J. 2020. “El Terror Represivo y El Reclutamiento Forzoso Del Ejército Golpista. El Caso de Galicia, 1936-1939.” Hispania Nova: Revista de Historia Contemporánea 18: 203–32.
Leira-Castiñeira, Francisco J, and Andrés Domı́nguez-Almansa. 2018. “Reclutados Para Ganar. Movilización y Respuesta de Los Soldados de Franco.” Ayer. Revista de Historia Contemporánea 111 (3): 79–107.
Lyall, Jason, and Yuri Zhukov. 2021. “Fratricidal Coercion in Modern War.” Available at SSRN 3956923.
Nussio, Enzo. 2017. “How Ideology Channels Indeterminate Emotions into Armed Mobilization.” PS: Political Science & Politics 50 (4): 928–31.
Nussio, Enzo, and Juan E Ugarriza. 2021. “Why Rebels Stop Fighting: Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia’s Insurgency.” International Security 45 (4): 167–203.
Rego, Maria Aurora Artiaga. 2014. “Movilización Rebelde En El Verano de 1936: Galicia,?‘ Una Nueva Covadonga?” In Otras Miradas Sobre Golpe, Guerra y Dictadura: Historia Para Un Pasado Incómodo, 111–49. Los Libros de la Catarata.
Rogall, Thorsten. 2021. “Mobilizing the Masses for Genocide.” American Economic Review 111 (1): 41–72.
Rozenas, Arturas, Roya Talibova, and Yuri Zhukov. 2023. “Fighting for Tyranny: State Repression and Combat Motivation.” Working Paper.
Sanı́n, Francisco Gutiérrez, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2014. “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 213–26.
Satyanath, Shanker, Nico Voigtländer, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2017. “Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party.” Journal of Political Economy 125 (2): 478–526.
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils W Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. “Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War.” World Politics 64 (1): 79–115.
Appendix
Appendix A.1: Electoral networks of rebellion
If electoral-patronage networks mobilized right-wing hardliners as first movers:
Right % ’36 to predict the share of first movers.
Turnout ’36 to predict the share of first movers.
| Volunteers July'36 | Placebo w/post-Aug '36 | |
|---|---|---|
| * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 | ||
| % Right 1936 | 0.132*** | -0.120** |
| (0.033) | (0.050) | |
| % Turnout 1936 | 0.097** | 0.000 |
| (0.044) | (0.042) | |
| Num.Obs. | 255 | 255 |
| R2 | 0.500 | 0.195 |
Appendix A.2: DiD
Appendix A.3: DiD
Lemoli and Martínez (EPSA, 2025)
Networks and Dynamics of Violent Political Mobilization Historical Evidence from Spain Giacomo Lemoli and Sergi Martínez sdmartines@eafit.edu.co | sergimartinez.github.io